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A  sim ple exam ple
F orm makes a difference. Saying such a thing seems a truism, seems quite obvious, quite easily verifiable in the so-called world of objects, not 
necessarily only the aesthetic ones. In general terms, »everything« around us 
has a certain form, which can be seen or otherwise perceived. Our daily 
experience is full of semiconscious or even unconscious recognitions of many 
forms. In an urban surroundings »forms« are standing around us in the shape 
of more or less architectural erections, »forms« are driving in the streets as 
A lfa, BMW, VW... cars, people’s faces are appearing in oval, long, rectangular 
forms, etc. Any particular form is perceived as being different, that is to say, 
as being identifiable among all other forms, which we can recognize in a 
certain »class of forms«. Cars can be identified as the vehicles on four wheels, 
made of steel, having windows, a steering wheel, etc. But a particular car can 
be recognized by its form, stored in our memory, as a car, which is different in 
comparison to all other types of cars. This rather simple example (which is 
only one among hundreds of possible empirical examples) reminds us that form 
in general has a prominent function in the world, decidedly marked by the 
production in series. Most certainly, the usage of different forms helps to 
prevent confusion, although not rarely it enhances it, because at the same time 
as meaning a difference, a particular form means a similarity as well. But when 
we talk about such practical general aspects concerning rather unproblematic, 
and simple aspects of the question of the form, we should not forget Walter 
Benjamin and his intervention in the field of the aesthetic discourse.
The m echanical reproduction
»The mass is a matrix from which all traditional behaviour toward works of art 
issues today in a new form. Quantity has been transmuted into quality. The 
greatly increased mass of participants has produced a change in the mode of 
participation. The fact that the new mode of participation first appeared in a 
disreputable form must not confuse the spectator.«1 Now our simple examples 
do not look so simple. Taking into account every known Benjamin text, no 
doubt quite apprehensible within the framework of its argumentation, brings a 
certain aspect, concerning a border between objects deemed to be aesthetic
1. Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Illuminations, 
Schocken Books, New York 1969, p.239
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and objects we usually call just »things«. If, as Benjamin has said, the very 
notion of art gets thoroughly changed by the process of the mechanical 
reproduction, then we should presume that the world, being mirrored, 
expressed, articulated... in such an art, was some way changed. Maybe we can 
risk an assumption that this meaning goes without saying with Benjamin’s 
insight. A fter all we are talking about a relatively short piece of writing, a 
glimpse of a genius -  as much as one could agree with such an assertion, and 
yet we are talking about a quite schematic hypothesis, which is rather open in 
its meaning. Benjamin hasn’t expressed any clear idea how the change in 
modes of the production of the art has really affected »the world«; his 
intention seems to be much other way around. True, he doesn’t omit the 
question. Before his discourse unfolds, he makes it clear that his starting point 
was M arx’s theory containing »prognostic value« concerning the abolition of 
capitalism. Although Benjamin himself held this starting point as a theoretical 
basis of his analysis of the changes of the cultural bias, brought by the 
development of »the capitalist« mode of production, it has been soon 
identified by his distinguished reader -  namely Adorno -  as the »undialectical 
side« of his approach. As it is precisely reported in Richard W ollin’s book on 
Benjamin, Adorno’s criticism has been aimed at all the weakest points in 
Benjamin’s text,2 which is not to say that Adorno grasped the full meaning of 
the article, which could be apprehended only few decades later. Or, in other 
words, Adorno has been most probably concerned with the aesthetic problems, 
on which he shared a common interest with Benjamin. And maybe it can be 
even proved that the »The work of art...« occupies a special place within the 
context of the whole fragmented Benjamin work. As much as this paper 
obviously isn’t in accordance with Adorno’s views, it isn’t in accordance with, 
at least, Benjamin’s style and approach in most of the rest of his discourse on 
aesthetic phenomena of his time.
However, taking into account Adorno’s criticism helps a bit in our evaluation 
of those meanings of the Benjamin’s text, which transcend the boundaries of 
the age in which it was written. Some political motives, the intellectual revolt 
against fascism most visible among them, clearly belong to historical 
determinations, which caused Benjamin’s strong criticism of the idea of the 
autonomous work of art. Such a stand could be well understood within the 
logic of the text itself seeking to define artistic production as a kind of a 
»material force«, as an agency of the emancipation -  not as a product of a
2. Dialectical though your essay may be - writes Adorno to Benjamin - it is not so in the case 
of the autonomous work of art itself; it disregards an elementary experience which becomes 
more evident to me every day in my own musical experience - that precisely the uttermost 
consistency in the pursuit of the technical laws of autonomous art changes this art and instead 
of rendering it taboo or fetish, brings it close to the state of freedom, of something that can 
be consciously produced and made. Cf. cit, Richard Wollin, Walter Benjamin (An Aesthetic 
of Redemption), Columbia University Press, New York 1982.
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solitary intellectual effort (which an autonomous work of art is usually 
supposed to be), but as a consciousness creating force. Benjamin’s supposed 
over-reaction against J’artpour 1’art is not based on a perception of the fascism 
as only a »brutal totalitarianism«. On the contrary, the problem is that the... 
»aesthetic concept of culture (Kulturbegriff) isn’t... exterior to fascism, to his 
cult of the form as the power claim by the privileged Subject, who in his 
tendency already encircles the totality of the form-able material into the 
political sphere...«3 So the problem is that fascism makes use of the mass 
culture, made possible by mechanical reproduction, and Benjamin’s intention is 
to show that, in spite of it, the dawn of the age of a new mode of production -  
the aesthetic products included -  brings means of the emancipation through 
the »transformation of the superstructure«.
Benjamin’s »clash with fascism« clearly helped the author to express some 
views, which could be considered along the lines of Adorno’s criticism as a 
distortion or even as a bit crude reductionism. Nevertheless, a question could 
be put forward: how really important is this side of the text for its main 
points? The communication, personal as it may be, between Benjamin and 
Adorno, reflected two different points of view at the same traumatic problem. 
A dorno’s approach led to problems of »enslaved subjectivity« of the Subject, 
who »lost his spontaneity«, and autonomy in a subjection to market forces, etc. 
Consequentially, A dorno’s aesthetic theory became a brilliant illustration of 
the philosophy marked by the pessimism and even nostalgia. Although 
Benjamin’s discourse hasn’t been developed in such a wide scope, confined to 
fragments and not finished more or less short essays, quite often, as already 
mentioned above, treating rather disparate (and desperate) subjects, especially 
the »Work of Art...« -  along with a few other probes in the same direction -  
opened some questions, which continue to bother us a long time after the 
author’s unfortunate death.
The m ystery  o f  non-m ystery
The manner in which the set of questions we have in mind was put forward in 
the »Work of Art...«, is somewhat schematic, but that is precisely the form of 
theoretical problems, which most often proves to be very productive for a 
further development.4 The »mystery« of the effectivness of such a type of
3. Ansgar Hillach, »Benjamins Diagnose des Faschismus«, in Walter Benjamin (Profane 
Erleuchtung und rettende Kritik), (ed. by N. W. Bolz and R. Faber), Koenigshausen+Neumann, 
Wuerzburg 1985, p. 257.
4. The same may be said, for example, about the Althusser’s concept of the »ideological 
apparatuses of the state«, which caused a lot of controversy in the philosophical and political 
debate in the previous decade, but has been also repudiated many times over on the ground of 
its »schematicism«. But it looks like that especially those Althusser’s critics, who tried to 
eradicate the concept itself, prolonged its life by causing many Althusser advocating 
counter-attacks. Very often they admitted that a dose of schematisism is obvious in the 
Althusser’s theory, but this cannot belittle the fact of »genious« of the scheme.
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discourse isn’t its depth, much less anything »hidden behind« its obvious 
meaning. Of course, what could be a »depth« of a »schematic« text, and how 
could anything be »hidden« under the surface of written words and sentences? 
So the »mystery« must be elsewhere. To put it simply: the mystery is that there 
is no mystery, the genius lies precisely in provoking a deja vu effect in the 
reader. Yes, everybody sees that the print, photography, cinema, etc., are the 
result of an intellectual (or the aesthetic) endeavour, but at the same time they 
are the products of machinery, the products of the process of mechanical 
reproduction, and everybody feels that a possibility to bring close many works 
of art from secluded places means a change in a way. But what way? This is 
the question, which »just anybody« couldn’t feel important to answer. Well, all 
right, copies of the portrait of Mona Lisa suddenly became accessible and 
could decorate a wall in a no matter how humble a home, the great novels of 
French realism are accessible in cheap editions, etc., so what? This is the point, 
where Benjamin’s intervention proved to be fruitful. Simple as his discovery 
may seem (though in the final analysis it isn’t so simple at all), it happened as 
a finally uttered knowledge of the fact, which had been repressed by the 
dominant »class culture«. And probably it isn’t just a coincidence that 
Benjamin named this »fact« vaguely the »aura«, which as a notion gets its 
meaning through the process of disappearing. The aura is, by virtue of »being 
something through non-existence«, in a full sense of the word, a dialectical 
notion, which marks a profound change in the symbolic order of things. 
Aesthetic objects certainly occupy a distinguished place in this order. But, as 
Benjamin found out, their »aura« secured a special sphere of the effectiveness 
of their symbolic power, they were a part of an order of the especially divided 
social imaginary, which continues to be active long after the mechanical 
reproduction has taken place. The disappearance of the aura through intrusion 
of the reproduction of the classic works of art, and even more significantly, 
through a development of the new forms of art, made possible by technical 
devices, brings a turn into the function of the art itself. Characteristically, the 
»new forms of art« were dismissed by privileged public as a cheap 
entertainment for the uneducated.
Let us now take a look into a problem of what happens with the form. The 
aesthetic views elaborated at the beginning of the modern age (notably within 
the German philosophy and the movement of romanticism) in general 
developed the concept of the form in accordance with a concept of the 
Subject. Tu put it briefly, subjectivity has been perceived as being inscribed 
into the difference, which is brought into existence by the form. Although 
Benjamin does not say so, subjectivity has been seen as a constituent of the 
aura, participating in the divine or even replacing it. O f course, the problem of 
the form, much easier explained in a case of visual arts, paintings and 
sculptures, than in a case of narrative arts, especially in a confrontation with
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the problem of the content, in different solutions gave way to the construction 
of the certain rules providing paths to creating the sensation of beauty, etc. 
But all the time there was no doubt that the aesthetic creation belongs to 
nobler human activities, and that it is in possession of the »higher« truth, and 
there was no doubt that enjoyment of the preciousness of the works of art 
requires an adequate education, especially for the purpose of perceiving the 
sublime qualities of different forms. One may object, saying this is an 
oversimplification, but such an objection doesn’t rule out the point, which is, 
that the form »formed« a separate reality of the works of art. With a gradual 
transformation of the original (and even revolutionary in their age) aesthetic 
theories into the ideology of art, the ideology of an »elite« public, the form »as 
such« became an object of obsession on both sides: the public and the artists. 
But when this point was reached, it was already obvious that all around emerge 
all sorts of »entertainment«, and that »unworthy« forms of decoration invade 
the streets in the metropolitan areas.
O rchid in  the  land  o f  technology
Benjamin, using the terms of political economy in defining the superstructure, 
saw the decisive transformation, crucial in attaining a new form of society. It 
isn’t so im portant as it may seem, that he understood this movement as a way 
to communism, which had been a lively idea at the time. Much more 
significant is his conceptualization of the consequences of the perceived 
properties of what had been going on. »The equipment-free aspect of reality 
here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has 
become an orchid in the land of technology.«5 The results of such an 
assumption may be taken as sociological, but no less are they significant for the 
idea of the subjectivity as well. What we may say today is, that Benjamin was 
on the verge of discovering not only the disappearance of the aura, but the 
disappearance of the Subject itself, too. Again in Benjamin’s »sociological« 
observation the change concerns the art as much as the »masses«: »To pry an 
object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose 
’sense of the universal equality of things’ has increased to such a degree that it 
extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction. Thus is 
manifested in the field of perception what in the theoretical sphere is 
noticeable in the increasing importance of statistics. The adjustment of reality 
to the masses and of the masses to reality is a process of unlimited scope, as 
much for thinking as for perception.«6 What is seen here from the side of 
object is at the same time reflected by a change in the structure of subjectivity, 
whose reality must become split in a way as a contradiction of form against 
form (replacing the old contradiction between the form and the content). The 
instrument representing the new structure of reality -  the movie camera -
5. Walter Benjamin, Ibid., p. 233.
6. Ibid., p. 223.
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functions on the level of a new »science«, which ruins the idea of the Subject 
born to be autonomous: »The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as 
does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.«7
Entering mass perception, the new forms of aesthetic praxis overturn the 
whole functioning of the arts in the social imaginary. Although discussing the 
problems of the form of the aesthetic objects, the products of »technological« 
arts included, may still be a »noble« task of aesthetic theory, there is no doubt 
that Benjamin’s observations approve an assertion, that the aesthetic 
production interferes with the reproduction of the society in a much more 
decisive way than anybody ever dreamed of before the emergence of the 
mechanical reproduction. (Maybe today we could widen the number of 
synonymous adjectives, beside »mechanical«, i.e. »electronically«, 
»multimediatically«,etc.) The recognition of the form became in a broad sense 
simply functional, and everybody has been trained to recognize forms 
automatically by being exposed to almost continuous and often unwanted 
influence of images, sounds, signs, designs, etc. There is no way to sell new 
»contents« in approved forms. The public must be shocked into perceiving the 
difference, which is nothing else but the form.
Meanwhile the »subjectivity« turns into a set of »looks« prescribed by the 
»artists« in the make-up and fashion industries. Declining to be »formed« by 
them or at the same time not to be affected by images and sounds, now even 
pouring down from the sky, always neatly packed into a appropriate form, 
means only acquiring a different form. However, following this path would 
bring us to another more recent intellectual account of the world foreseen by 
Benjamin, namely to Christopher Lasch and his »Culture of Narcissism,« and 
his deciphering the world of forms as a »form of existence«.
7. Ibid, p. 237.
